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Abstract
We consider the problems of distribution estimation and heavy hitter (frequency) estimation
under privacy and communication constraints. While these constraints have been studied sep-
arately, optimal schemes for one are sub-optimal for the other. We propose a sample-optimal
ε-locally differentially private (LDP) scheme for distribution estimation, where each user com-
municates only one bit, and requires no public randomness. We show that Hadamard Response,
a recently proposed scheme for ε-LDP distribution estimation is also utility-optimal for heavy
hitter estimation. Finally, we show that unlike distribution estimation, without public ran-
domness where only one bit suffices, any heavy hitter estimation algorithm that communicates
o(min{logn, log k}) bits from each user cannot be optimal.
1 Introduction
Inferring efficiently from data forms the core of modern data science. In many applications, being
able to perform inference from available data is perhaps the most critical step. However, in several
cases, these data samples contain sensitive information about the various users, who would like
to protect their information from being leaked. For example, medical data may contain sensitive
information about individuals that can be inferred without proper design of the collection scheme,
a key issue highly publicized following the publications of [1, 2].
Private data release and computation has been studied in various domains, such as statistics,
machine learning, database theory, algorithm design, and cryptography (See e.g., [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]).
Differential Privacy (DP) [9] has emerged as one of the most popular notions of privacy (see [9,
6, 10, 11, 12], references therein, and the recent book [13]). DP has been adopted by companies
including Google, Apple and Microsoft [14, 15, 16].
A popular privacy definition is local differential privacy (LDP), which was perhaps first proposed
in [3], and more recently in [17, 18], where users do not trust the data collector, and privatize their
data before releasing it. LDP is a stringent privacy constraint that requires noise to be added at each
sample, and thus providing privacy to all users, even if the data collector is compromised. Often,
∗Supported by NSF-CCF-CRII-1657471, NSF-CCF-1846300 (CAREER). To appear at International Conference
on Machine Learning (ICML), 2019.
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LDP guarantees come at the cost of increased data requirement for various canonical inference
tasks.
Communication constraints are increasingly becoming a bottleneck to more and more dis-
tributed inference problems. For example, in mobile devices, and small sensors with a limited
power/limited uplink capacity, the communication budget can overshadow the local computations
performed at each of them. This has led to a growing interest in understanding various inference
tasks under limited communication, where the users do not have enough communication to even
transmit their data [19, 20], and recent works have established optimal bounds, and algorithms for
fundamental problems such as distribution estimation and hypothesis testing [21, 22, 23, 24]. Like
privacy, these works show that communication constraints also increase the data requirements for
vatious tasks.
1.1 Notations and Set-up
We consider the following distributed setting. The underlying domain of interest is a known discrete
set X of size k. Without loss of generality, let X = [k] := {1, . . . , k}. There are n users, and where
user i observes Xi ∈ [k], and then sends a message Yi ∈ Y, the output domain, to the central server
(data collector, referee) R, who upon observing the messages Y n := Y1, . . . , Yn wants to solve some
pre-specified inference task. At user i, the process of generating message Yi from input Xi can be
characterized via a channel (a randomized mapping) Wi : [k]→ Y, where Wi(x, y) is the probability
that Yi = y given that Xi = x.
We now instantiate LDP, and communication constraints as special cases of this model.
1. Local Differential Privacy. A scheme is ε-Locally Differentially Private (LDP), if ∀x, x′ ∈ X ,
and ∀y ∈ Y,
Wi(x, y)
Wi(x′, y)
≤ eε, ∀i = 1, . . . , n. (1)
Throughout the paper, we consider the high privacy regime, where ε = O(1).
2. Communication Constraints. Given a communication budget ` > 0, the scheme is `-bit
communication limited if Y = {0, 1}`, and the output messages are at most ` bits long.
We consider two inference tasks that R wants to solve.
1. Discrete Distribution Estimation. Let ∆k denote the collection of all distributions over the
input domain [k]. p ∈ ∆k is an unknown distribution. User i observes Xi, which is an independent
draw from p. The referee’s goal, upon observing the messages Y1, . . . , Yn is to estimate p. The goal
is to design the Wn := W1, . . . ,Wn’s (satisfying the appropriate constraints), and a pˆ : Yn → ∆k
to minimize the expected minimax `1 risk:
r(`1,∆k) := min
pˆ
min
Wn
max
p∈∆k
E [‖p− pˆ‖1] . (2)
When W1, . . . ,Wn satisfy (1), we denote r(`1,∆k) by rDP(`1,∆k, ε), and when W1, . . . ,Wn are
communication limited by at most ` bits, it is denoted by rCL(`1,∆k, `)
2. Frequency/Heavy Hitter Estimation. Unlike distribution estimation, in this case there is
no distributional assumption on the Xi’s (i.e., Xn := X1, . . . , Xn can be any element in [k]n), and
the goal is to estimate the empirical distribution of the symbols. In particular, for x ∈ [k], let Nx be
the number of appearances of x in Xn. The objective is to estimate the Nx/n’s from the messages
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under LDP constraints. This problem has been studied under the `∞ norm objective, namely the
goal is to design , and pˆ to minimize
rDP(`∞, k, ε) := min
pˆ
min
Wn
max
Xn
E
[
max
x
∣∣∣∣pˆ(x)− Nxn
∣∣∣∣] , (3)
where the expectation is over the randomness over messages induced by the channels, and the
estimator pˆ.
We will consider simultaneous message passing (SMP) communication protocols, where each
user sends their message to the server at the same time. Within these, we study both protocols
that have access to public randomness, and those that do not.
1. Private-coin Schemes: In private-coin schemes, the players choose their channels Wi’s
independently, without coordination. Formally, U1, . . . , Un are n mutually independent random
variables distributed across users 1, . . . , n respectively. User i chooses Wi as a function of Ui.
Referee R knows the distribution of Ui, but not the instantiation of Ui used to choose Wi.
We first observe that under ε-LDP or communication-constraints, private-coin schemes can be
assumed to be deterministic, namely the channels W1, . . . ,Wn are all fixed a priori.
Lemma 1. Private-coin schemes, and deterministic schemes are equivalent under both LDP and
communication-limited constraints.
Proof. Note that the set of channels satisfying (1), and those with output at most ` bits are both
convex. For any user i, let EUi [Wi] denote the expected channel, over randomness in Ui. By
convexity, EUi [Wi] also satisfies the constraints, and can therefore be chosen as the deterministic
channel whose input-output behavior is the same as choosing Ui, and then Wi.
2. Public-coin Schemes: In public-coin protocols, the users and referee all have access to a
common random variable U . The users select their channels as a function of U , namely Wi = fi(U).
R solves the inference task using messages Y n, and U .
3. Symmetric Schemes: These are schemes, where each user uses the same process to select
their channel Wi’s. From Lemma 1, we can conclude for any private-coin symmetric scheme for
LDP and communication constraints, there is a deterministic W such that W1 = . . . = Wn = W .
Motivation. Beyond the theoretical interest in understanding the power of different kinds of
schemes and randomness, we note some practical implications of this work. In particular, private-
coin schemes are easier to implement than public-coin schemes, since they do not require additional
communication from the server specifying the common random variable U . Even within private-coin
schemes, symmetric schemes are easier to implement, since all users perform the same operation.
We restrict to SMP schemes and do not consider the more general interactive schemes. These
operate in rounds, and in each round some users send their messages. The players can choose their
channels upon observing these previous messages [25, 26, 18, 27]. [27] show that interactive schemes
can be much more powerful than non-interactive schemes.
We consider both LDP distribution estimation and heavy hitter estimation and study the trade-
offs between utility and communication for these problems.
3
1.2 Prior Work
Distribution estimation is a classical task in the centralized setting, where R observes the true
samples Xn, and it is known that [28]
r(`1,∆k) = Θ
√k
n
. (4)
Distribution estimation under ε-LDP is also well studied in the past few years [29, 15, 30, 31,
32, 33, 34]. [29, 31, 32, 33] have given private-coin, symmetric schemes which for ε = O(1) (our
regime of interest) achieve
rDP(`1,∆k, ε) = Θ
√ k2
nε2
. (5)
This `1 risk is optimal over all protocols, even while allowing public-coins [26, 32, 24]. Note
that compared to the centralized setting, the risk is a factor of Θ(
√
k/ε) higher which shows the
significant drop in the utility under LDP.
Distribution estimation under LDP constraints has only been formally studied using private-
coin schemes. In terms of communication requirements (number of bits to describe Yi’s) [29, 32]
require Ω(k) bits per user, and Hadamard Response (HR) of [33] requires log k + 2 bits.
Distribution estimation has also been studied recently under very low communication bud-
get [21, 22, 23, 24], where each user sends only ` < log k bits to R. In particular, now it is
established that by only using private-coin communication schemes,
rCL(`1,∆k, `) = Θ
(√
k2
nmin{2`, k}
)
. (6)
Further, these results are tight even with public coins. Note that for ` = 1 (each user sends one
bit),
rCL(`1,∆k, 1) = Θ
√k2
n
. (7)
(5) and (7) show the parallel between LDP, and communication constraints for `1 risk of discrete
distribution estimation. In particular, note that for both constraints there is an additional factor
of Θ(
√
k) blow-up in the `1 risk over the centralized setting.
The problem of heavy hitter estimation under ε-LDP has also received a lot of attention [35,
15, 36, 25, 37, 16, 38]. The optimal `∞ (see (3)) risk was established in [36] as
rDP(`∞, k, ε) := Θ
1
ε
√
log k
n
. (8)
The state of the art research focus on improved computation time, and reduced communication
from the users at the expense of public randomness from the referee [36, 37, 38]. In particular,
these works propose algorithms that require only O(1) communication from each user, and more
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Randomness
Communication
O(1) bits O (log k) bits
Symmetric, Private Randomness Ω(1) (Theorem 2) Θ
(√
k2
nε2
)
[33]
Private Randomness Θ(
√
k2
nε2 ) (Corollary 1) Θ
(√
k2
nε2
)
Public Randomness Θ
(√
k2
nε2
)
Θ
(√
k2
nε2
)
Table 1: `1 risk for distribution estimation under different communication budget and randomness.
Randomness
Communication
O(1) bits O(log k) bits
Symmetric, Private Randomness Ω(1) Θ
(√
log k
nε2
)
(Theorem 3)
Private Randomness Ω(1) (Theorem 4) Θ
(√
log k
nε2
)
Public Randomness Θ
(√
log k
nε2
)
[36] Θ
(√
log k
nε2
)
Table 2: `∞ risk for frequency estimation under different communication budget and schemes.
interestingly, are able to achieve a running time (at the referee) that is almost linear in n, and only
logarithmic in k. We also note that the algorithm in [37] can in fact be simulated at the users who
can then transmit it, causing an increased communication cost from the users.
The complementary problem of hypothesis testing has also been studied in the locally differen-
tially private setting in [39, 40, 41], where the goal is to test whether the data samples are generated
from one class of distributions or another.
1.3 Our Results and Techniques
We start by stating informally a remarkable result of [36] that can help provide better context for
some of the prior work and our new results.
Lemma 2 ([36]). Any private-coin scheme with arbitrary communication requirements can be con-
verted into a public-coin scheme that requires only one bit of communication from each user with
almost no loss in performance.
This result implies that with public randomness there exist schemes for both distribution esti-
mation and heavy hitter estimation with one bit communication from each user. In this context, the
main contribution of [38, 37] is to design schemes that are computationally efficient, as discussed
earlier.
In this paper, in some sense, we study the converse question.
Is public randomness necessary to reduce communication from users under LDP?
One of our main results is that for the two related problems of distribution estimation and heavy
hitter estimation, the answer to this question is different. For LDP distribution estimation, we
design a scheme with optimal `1 risk that needs no public randomness, and transmits only one
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bit of communication per player. We also show any private-coin scheme with optimal risk for
heavy hitter estimation must communicate ω(1) bits per user. We now describe our results and
techniques.
Distribution Estimation. To build toward constant communication private-coin distribution
estimation schemes, recall that the known optimal distribution estimation schemes [26, 31, 32, 33]
are all symmetric, and require Ω(log k) communication bits per message.
Our first result in Theorem 2 (Section 3) states that any private-coin scheme that is both
symmetric, and where each player transmits fewer than log k bits has minimax `1 risk equal to 1.
This shows that HR has optimal communication (up to ±2 bits) among all symmetric schemes.
More importantly, this implies that any private-coin scheme that aims to communicate fewer bits
must be asymmetric, namely the users cannot all have the same Wi’s.
We then design an asymmetric private-coin LDP distribution estimation scheme with optimal
`1 risk and where each user transmits only one bit. The precise result is given in Theorem 1
(Section 2).
Our scheme does the following. User i is assigned a subset B (can be different for different
users) of the domain [k] deterministically (hence private-coin). Upon observing Xi, they would
like to send I{Xi ∈ B}. To do so with ε-LDP, they flip the random variable with probability
1/(eε+1) and and send the result as Yi. We will choose subsets B’s defined by a Hadamard matrix
of appropriate size, which not only achieves optimal `1 risk, but also allow the server to compute
pˆ in nearly-linear time O˜(k + n).
Our scheme, while inspired by Hadamard Response, differs from it in the following sense. As
described in Section 4, HR considers a Hadamard matrix where the rows are indexed by the input
domain [k]. Upon observing a symbol Xi, user i considers the Xith row of the Hadamard matrix,
and transmits an index of the columns based on whether that entry is a 1 or not in the matrix. This
requires about log k bits. On the other hand, our one-bit scheme assigns to each user, a column
of the Hadamard matrix, and the locations in that column that have a 1 correspond to the subset
assigned to that user.
Heavy Hitter Estimation. All known optimal algorithms for heavy hitter estimation described
in the previous section use public randomness. In Theorem 3, we show that HR (symmetric, and
no public randomness, and log k + 2 bits of communication per user) has the optimal `∞ risk for
heavy hitter estimation.
However, we remark that the computation requirements of HR is O(k log k + n), which can be
much worse than the guarantees in [37] for k  n.
Finally, in Theorem 4 we show that unlike for distribution estimation, any private-coin scheme
for heavy hitter estimation requires large communication. In particular, we show that optimal
private-coin heavy-hitter estimation requires Ω(min{log k, logn}) bits of communication per user.
For a complete summary of results, see Table 1 and 2. In each table, the problem becomes
easier as we go down in rows and go right in columns.
Organization. In Section 2, we provide an optimal one-bit private-coin distribution estimation
scheme. In Section 3, we show that any symmetric private-coin scheme must transmit log k bits
per user. In Section 4, we prove the optimality of Hadamard Response for heavy hitter estimation
and finally in Section 5, we show that without public randomness, heavy hitter estimation requires
large communication.
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2 One-Bit Private-coin LDP Distribution Estimation
We propose a deterministic scheme, namely the Wi’s are fixed apriori, for LDP distribution esti-
mation that has the optimal `1 risk, and where the output of each Wi is binary, i.e., one bit of
communication per user. The approach is the following. Each user is assigned to a deterministic
set B ⊂ [k]. Upon observing a sample X ∼ p, they output Y ∈ {0, 1}, according to the following
distribution
Pr (Y = 1) =
{
eε
eε+1 , if X ∈ B,
1
eε+1 , otherwise.
(9)
In other words, each user sends the indicator of whether their input belongs to a particular subset
of the domain. The choice of the subsets is inspired by the Hadamard Response (HR) scheme
described in [33]. A brief introduction of HR can be found in Section 4 where we show that HR is
utility-optimal for heavy hitter estimation.
Recall Sylvester’s construction of Hadamard matrices.
Definition 1. Let H1 def= [1], and for m = 2j , for j ≥ 1,
Hm
def=
[
Hm/2 Hm/2
Hm/2 −Hm/2
]
.
Let K = 2dlog2(k+1)e be the smallest power of 2 larger than k. Let HK be the K×K Hadamard
matrix. For simplicity of working with HK , we assume that the underlying distribution is over [K]
by appending p with zeros, giving pK = (p(1), . . . , p(k), 0, . . . , 0). For i = 1, . . . ,K, let Bi be the
set of all x ∈ [K], such that HK(x, i) = 1, namely the row indices that have ‘1’ in the ith column.
We associate the subsets for each user as follows. We deterministically divide the n users numbered
1, . . . , n into K subsets S1, S2, . . . , SK , such that
Si := {j ∈ [n]|j ≡ i (mod K)}.
For each user j, let ij ∈ [K] be the index such that j ∈ Sij . The jth user then sends its binary
output Yi according to the distribution in (9), with B = Bij , and X = Xj .
For any i = 1, . . . ,K, the users in Si have the same output distribution. Let si be the probability
Yj = 1 for j ∈ Si. Let p(Bi) = Pr (X ∈ Bi|X ∼ p). Note that
si = p(Bi) · e
ε
eε + 1 + (1− p(Bi))
1
eε + 1
= 1
eε + 1 + p(Bi) ·
eε − 1
eε + 1 . (10)
Let pB := (p(B1), p(B2), . . . , p(BK)). Then we obtain
s := (s1, . . . , sK) =
1
eε + 11K +
eε − 1
eε + 1pB. (11)
This relates p(Bi) with si, and now we relate p(x) with p(Bi)’s. Recall that B1 = [K], the
entire set. Since Bi’s are defined by the rows of Hadamard matrix, we obtain the following [33],
pB =
HK · pK + 1K
2 . (12)
We can now relate the results and describe our estimate.
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1. Use an empirical estimate ŝ for s as
ŝi :=
1
|Si|
∑
j∈Si
Yj . (13)
2. Motivated by (10) estimate pB as
p̂B =
eε + 1
eε − 1
(
ŝ− 1K
eε + 1
)
. (14)
3. Estimate for the original distribution using (12) as
p̂K := H−1K · (2p̂B − 1K) =
1
K
HK · (2p̂B − 1K). (15)
4. Output p̂, the projection of the first k coordinates of the K dimensional p̂K on the simplex
4k.
Theorem 1. Let p̂ be the output of the scheme above when the underlying distribution is p. Then,
E
[
‖p̂− p‖22
]
≤ min
{
2k(eε + 1)2
n(eε − 1)2 , 8
√
(eε + 1)2 log k
n(eε − 1)2
}
.
Proof. First note that ŝ is an unbiased estimator of s, and (12), (10) and (13), are all linear.
Therefore, p̂K is an unbiased estimator of pK . Hence,
E
[
‖p̂K(1 : k)− pK(1 : k)‖22
]
=
k∑
x=1
Var
(
p̂K(x)
)
.
From (15), p̂K(x) is a weighted sum of {(2p̂B(i)−1)}Ki=1 with coefficients either + 1K or − 1K . Hence
∀x ∈ [K],
Var
(
p̂K(x)
)
≤ 4
K2
K∑
y=1
Var
(
p̂B(y)
)
= 4
K2
(
eε + 1
eε − 1
)2 K∑
i=1
Var (ŝi) .
By (13), ŝi is an average of |Si| independent Bernoulli random variables with |Si| ≥ n2K , hence
∀i ∈ [K],
Var (ŝy) ≤ K2n.
Combining these, we get: ∀x ∈ [K],
Var
(
p̂K(x)
)
= 4
K2
(
eε + 1
eε − 1
)2 K∑
i=1
Var (ŝi) ≤ 2(e
ε + 1)2
n(eε − 1)2 .
Then the final estimate p̂ is the projection of pK on the first k coordinates onto the simplex 4k.
Since 4k is convex,
E
[
‖p̂− p‖22
]
≤ E
[
‖p̂K(1 : k)− pK(1 : k)‖22
]
≤
k∑
i=1
(
eε + 1
eε − 1
)2 2
n
≤ 2k(e
ε + 1)2
n(eε − 1)2 .
Moreover, we have the following lemma.
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Lemma 3. (Corollary 2.3 [34]) Let L ⊂ Rd be a symmetric convex body of k vertices {aj}kj=1, and
let y ∈ L and y¯ = y + z for some z ∈ Rd. Let yˆ = arg minw∈L‖w− y¯‖22. Then, we must have:
‖y− yˆ‖22 ≤ 4 max
j∈[k]
{〈z,aj〉} (16)
Notice that according to (14), (13) and (10), {p̂B(i) − pB(i)}Ki=1 are empirical averages of
independent zero mean Bernoulli random variables scaled by constant eε+1eε−1 and they are mutually
independent. Hence, they are sub-Gaussian with variance proxy K2n
(
eε+1
eε−1
)2
.
Additionally, by (10) and (15), we know each of {p̂K(x) − pK(x)} is a linear combination of
{p̂B(i)−pB(i)}Ki=1 with coefficient either + 2K or− 2K . Hence {p̂K(x)−pK(x)}’s are also sub-Gaussian
with variance proxy 2n(
eε+1
eε−1)2 (see Corollary 1.7 [42]).
Hence using Lemma 3, we have:
E
[
‖p̂− p‖22
]
≤ 4E
[
kmax
x=1
|p̂K(x)− pK(x)|
]
≤ 8
√
(eε + 1)2 log k
n(eε − 1)2 .
The last step is due to a well-known bound on expectation of maximum of sub-Gaussian random
variables (see Theorem 1.16 [42]).
Corollary 1. Let p̂ be the estimate given by the scheme described above. Then for any input p,
E [‖p̂− p‖1] ≤
√
2k2(eε + 1)2
n(eε − 1)2 .
Proof. By Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
E [‖p̂− p‖1] ≤
√
kE
[‖p̂− p‖22].
Plugging in Theorem 1 gives the bound.
Notice here that eε−1 = O(ε) when ε = O(1). Hence we have E [‖p̂− p‖1] = O
(√
k2
nε2
)
, which
is order optimal.
3 Lower Bound on Communication Complexity of Symmetric Schemes
We show that any private-coin symmetric distribution estimation scheme must communicate at
least log k bits.
Theorem 2. For any symmetric private-coin scheme without shared randomness that transmits
` < log k bits per user, there exists a distribution p0 ∈ 4k such that for Xn ∼ p0,
E [‖pˆ(Y n)− p0‖1] ≥ 1, (17)
where Y n are the messages sent to R after privatizing Xn.
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Proof. Assume that Y = [2`] is the output alphabet. By Lemma 1, and symmetry, let W be an
`-bit communication channel used by each user. We can describe W as a transition probability
matrix (TPM) W ∈ Rk×2` :
W (x, y) := Pr (Y = y|X = x).
When the input distribution is p, the distribution of the output message is q = W T p. Notice that
W T is an 2` × k matrix, which is underdetermined since 2` < k. Therefore, there exists a non-zero
vector e such that W Te = 0. Further, since W is a TPM, each row of W sums to one, and therefore
W Te = 0 implies that ∑kx=1 e(x) = 0.
By scaling appropriately, we can ensure that ‖e‖1 = 2, which ensures that the positive entries
sum to one, and negative entries sum to −1. Now consider the distributions specified by these
entries, namely let p1 = max{e, 0} and p2 = max{−e, 0}. Then these two distributions have
disjoint support, however,
W T p1 = q = W T p2,
showing that their output message distributions are identical and they cannot be distinguished.
Since ‖p1 − p2‖1 = 2, when we get Y n ∼ qn, for at least one of these distributions, the expected `1
error is 1, proving the result.
Note that Theorem 2 holds for all symmetric schemes, not just ε-LDP schemes, which means the
result also extends to non-private setting, proving the importance of asymmetry in communication
efficient distribution estimation. Further, with just two more bits, using log k + 2 bits, HR is
private-coin, symmetric, and does optimal distribution estimation.
4 Hadamard Response is Optimal for Heavy Hitter Estimation
We first describe the scheme briefly, and prove the optimality. We refer the reader to [33] for
details. Recall that K is the smallest power of 2 larger than k. Let HK be the K ×K Hadamard
matrix. The output alphabet of the messages is Y := [K] For each input symbol x ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let
Cx be the symbols y ∈ [K] such that there is a 1 in the yth column of the (x + 1)th row of HK .
The reason we start with the second row is because the first row of HK is all one’s. Since HK is
Hadamard,
1. ∀x ∈ [k], |Cx| = K2 , and
2. ∀x 6= x′ ∈ [k], |Cx ∩ Cx′ | = K4 .
HR is the following symmetric privatization scheme for all user with output y ∈ [K], x ∈ [k],
W (x, y) =

2eε
K(1+eε) if y ∈ Cx,
2
K(1+eε) otherwise.
(18)
Consider an arbitrary input Xn, with Nx being the number of appearances of x’s in Xn. Let
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NCx :=
∑
i∈[n] 1{Yi ∈ Cx} be the number of output symbols that are in Cx. Then, we have
E [NCx ] =
∑
i∈[n]
E [1{Yi ∈ Cx}] =
∑
i∈[n]
Pr (Yi ∈ Cx)
=
∑
i∈[n]
(
1{Xi = x} e
ε
1 + eε + 1{Xi 6= x}
1
2
)
= e
ε − 1
2(eε + 1)Nx +
n
2 . (19)
Hence,
pˆ(x) = 2(e
ε + 1)
n(eε − 1)
(
NCx −
n
2
)
. (20)
is an unbiased estimator for Nxn . The performance of the estimator is stated in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. For any dataset Xn, the encoding scheme in (18) combined with the estimation
scheme in (20) satisfies that:
E
[
max
x∈[k]
∣∣∣∣pˆ(x)− Nxn
∣∣∣∣
]
≤ 4(e
ε + 1)
eε − 1
√
log k
n
. (21)
Proof. By (19), we know the estimator is unbiased. Since each NCx is a sum of n independent
Bernoulli random variables, pˆ(x)’s are sub-Gaussian with varaince proxy 4(e
+1)2
n(e−1)2 . Hence, by The-
orem 1.16 from [42], we get the result in (21).
In [36], a matching lower bound of Ω
(
1
ε
√
log k
n
)
when ε = O(1) is proved for LDP heavy hit-
ter estimation algorithms. The above theorem shows that the proposed algorithm has optimal
performance. We remark that this scheme has communication complexity of log k bits per user,
and the total computation complexity is O(k log k + n). The dependence on k is usually undesir-
able in this problem, and therefore more sophisticated schemes are designed, which require higher
communication complexity or shared randomness.
5 Communication Lower Bounds for Heavy Hitter Estimation
The previous section showed that with ` = log k + 2 bits of communication per user we can solve
heavy hitters problem optimally. In this section, we assume that ` < log k−2, and prove that there
is no private-coin heavy hitter detection scheme that communicates o(logn) bits per user and is
optimal.
Theorem 4. Let ` < log k−2. For all private-coin response schemes ({Wi}ni=1, pˆ) with only private
randomness and ` bits of communication, there exists a dataset X1, . . . , Xn with n > 12(2` + 1)2,
and x0 ∈ [k] such that:
E
[∥∥∥∥pˆ(Y n)(x0)− Nx(Xn)n
∥∥∥∥∞
]
≥ 12`+2 + 4 ,
where Yi = Wi(Xi) for i ∈ [n].
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Proof. We will use the probabilistic method to show the existence of such a dataset. To do so,
we design a dataset generating process, and show that the expected `∞ loss over the process and
randomness induced by the channels is large, which shows that the expected `∞ loss for the worst
dataset is also large.
Similar to Section 3, recall that each Wi can be represented by a k × 2` transition probability
matrix (TPM) where for user i, Wi(x, y) = Pr (Yi = y|Xi = x). Consider distributions p1, . . . , pn
over [k], and suppose the data at user i, Xi is generated from pi. Then qi, the output distribution
of Yi is given by W Ti pi. We will restrict to distributions pi’s to have support over the first 2` + 1
symbols. Namely, for all 2` + 1 < x ≤ k, pi(x) = 0. Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, since the
output dimension is 2`, for each i, there exists a non-zero vector ei ∈ Rk, such that ei(x) = 0 for
2` + 1 < x, and W Ti ei = 0. Further, recall that since Wi is a TPM,
∑k
x=1 ei(x) = 0. Therefore,
upon normalizing, assume ‖ei‖1 = 2. Let
pi = max{ei, 0}, p′i = max{−ei, 0}.
Then pi and p′i are valid distributions over [k] and effective support only {1, . . . , 2` + 1}, and
‖pi − p′i‖1 = 2. Similarly construct pi, p′i for each i = 1, . . . , n. Then,
2n =
k∑
x=1
n∑
i=1
|pi(x)− p′i(x)| =
2`+1∑
x=1
n∑
i=1
|pi(x)− p′i(x)|,
where we use that pi, and p′i are supported only over the first 2` + 1 symbols. Hence there exists
x0 ∈ [2` + 1], such that
n∑
i=1
|pi(x0)− p′i(x0)| ≥
2n
2` + 1 .
Without loss of generality, assume ∀i, pi(x0) ≤ p′i(x0). Then the above equation becomes
n∑
i=1
p′i(x0)−
n∑
i=1
pi(x0) ≥ 2n2` + 1 . (22)
Now consider two datasets generated as follows. Xn satisfies ∀i ∈ [n], Xi ∼ pi and X ′n satisfies
∀i ∈ [n], X ′i ∼ pi. Moreover since
W Ti pi = qi = W Ti p′i,
the output distribution Y n is identical for X ′n, and Xn.
Let Nx0(Xn) and Nx0(X ′n) be the number of appearances of x0 in Xn and X ′n. Then by (22),
E [Nx0(Xn)]− E
[
Nx0(X ′n)
]
>
2n
2` + 1 .
Moreover, since Nx0 are sum of independent binary random variables, Var (Nx0) ≤ n/4. Now
suppose ` < 14 logn− 1, then n/(2` + 1) > n3/4. Therefore, by Chebychev’s inequality, for large n,
Pr
(
Nx0(Xn)−Nx0(X ′n) >
n
2` + 1
)
> 0.9.
Since the two output distributions are indistinguishable, we have the error is at least n2`+1+2 for
one of the cases if this event happens. Hence the expectated loss would be at least 0.9× n2`+1+2 >
n
2`+2+4 .
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Hence we can see when ` = O(1). We cannot learn the frequency reliably up to accuracy better
than a constant. Moreover, when ` = o(logn + log(1/ε)), we get
1
2`+1 + 1 >
√
log k
nε2
,
implying that optimal frequency estimation algorithms must require Ω(logn + log(1/ε)) bits of
communication when there is no public randomness. Similar to Section 3, the result also extends
to non-private settings.
6 Experiments
We conduct empirical evaluations for the one-bit distribution learning algorithm without public
randomness proposed in Section 2. We compare the proposed algorithm (onebit) with other algo-
rithms including Randomized Response (RR) [3], RAPPOR [15], Hadamard Response (HR) [33]
and subset selection (subset) [32]. To obtain samples, we generate synthetic data from various
classes of distributions including uniform distribution, geometric distributions with parameter 0.8
and 0.98, Zipf distributions with parameter 1.0 and 0.5 and Two-step distribution. We conduct the
experiments for k = 1000 and ε = 1. The results are shown in Figure 1. Each point is the average
of 30 independent experiments.
From the figures, we can see the performance of our proposed scheme is comparable to the best
among all schemes for various kinds of distributions. And the communication complexity is only
one bit while the least among others is Ω(log k) bits [33].
(a) Uniform (b) Geo(0.8) (c) Geo(0.98) (d) Zipf(0.5)
(e) Zipf(1.0) (f) Two Steps
Figure 1: `1-error for k = 1000, p from Uniform, Geo(0.8), Geo(0.98), Zipf(0.5), Zipf(1.0) and Two-step
distributions.
13
Acknowledgements
The authors thank the anonymous reviewers for pointing out the result in [36] about one-bit public-
coin schemes, and other valuable suggestions, and Cle´ment Canonne and Sourbh Bhadane for
providing feedback on the manuscript.
References
[1] L. Sweeney, “k-anonymity: A model for protecting privacy,” International Journal of Uncer-
tainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems, vol. 10, no. 05, pp. 557–570, 2002.
[2] N. Homer, S. Szelinger, M. Redman, D. Duggan, W. Tembe, J. Muehling, J. V. Pearson, D. A.
Stephan, S. F. Nelson, and D. W. Craig, “Resolving individuals contributing trace amounts
of DNA to highly complex mixtures using high-density SNP genotyping microarrays,” PLoS
Genetics, vol. 4, no. 8, pp. 1–9, 2008.
[3] S. L. Warner, “Randomized response: A survey technique for eliminating evasive answer bias,”
Journal of the American Statistical Association, vol. 60, no. 309, pp. 63–69, 1965.
[4] T. Dalenius, “Towards a methodology for statistical disclosure control,” Statistisk Tidskrift,
vol. 15, pp. 429–444, 1977.
[5] I. Dinur and K. Nissim, “Revealing information while preserving privacy,” in Proceedings of
the 22nd ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART Symposium on Principles of Database Systems,
ser. PODS ’03. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2003, pp. 202–210.
[6] L. Wasserman and S. Zhou, “A statistical framework for differential privacy,” Journal of the
American Statistical Association, vol. 105, no. 489, pp. 375–389, 2010.
[7] M. J. Wainwright, M. I. Jordan, and J. C. Duchi, “Privacy aware learning,” in Advances in
Neural Information Processing Systems, 2012, pp. 1430–1438.
[8] K. Chaudhuri, C. Monteleoni, and A. D. Sarwate, “Differentially private empirical risk mini-
mization,” Journal of Machine Learning Research, vol. 12, pp. 1069–1109, 2011.
[9] C. Dwork, F. McSherry, K. Nissim, and A. Smith, “Calibrating noise to sensitivity in private
data analysis,” in Proceedings of the 3rd Conference on Theory of Cryptography, ser. TCC ’06.
Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2006, pp. 265–284.
[10] A. Blum, K. Ligett, and A. Roth, “A learning theory approach to noninteractive database
privacy,” Journal of the ACM (JACM), vol. 60, no. 2, p. 12, 2013.
[11] F. McSherry and K. Talwar, “Mechanism design via differential privacy,” in 48th Annual IEEE
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science. IEEE, 2007, pp. 94–103.
[12] P. Kairouz, S. Oh, and P. Viswanath, “The composition theorem for differential privacy,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 63, no. 6, pp. 4037–4049, 2017.
[13] C. Dwork and A. Roth, “The algorithmic foundations of differential privacy,” Foundations and
Trends R© in Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 9, no. 3–4, pp. 211–407, 2014.
14
[14] Differential Privacy Team, Apple, “Learning with privacy at scale,” https://machinelearning.
apple.com/docs/learning-with-privacy-at-scale/appledifferentialprivacysystem.pdf, December
2017.
[15] U´. Erlingsson, V. Pihur, and A. Korolova, “RAPPOR: Randomized aggregatable privacy-
preserving ordinal response,” in Proceedings of the 2014 ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, ser. CCS ’14. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2014, pp. 1054–1067.
[16] B. Ding, J. Kulkarni, and S. Yekhanin, “Collecting telemetry data privately,” in Advances in
Neural Information Processing Systems, 2017, pp. 3571–3580.
[17] A. Beimel, K. Nissim, and E. Omri, “Distributed private data analysis: Simultaneously solving
how and what,” in Proceedings of the 28th Annual International Cryptology Conference, ser.
CRYPTO ’08. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2008, pp. 451–468.
[18] S. P. Kasiviswanathan, H. K. Lee, K. Nissim, S. Raskhodnikova, and A. Smith, “What can we
learn privately?” SIAM Journal on Computing, vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 793–826, 2011.
[19] M. Braverman, A. Garg, T. Ma, H. L. Nguyen, and D. P. Woodruff, “Communication lower
bounds for statistical estimation problems via a distributed data processing inequality,” in
Proceedings of the 48th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing. ACM, 2016, pp.
1011–1020.
[20] Y. Dagan and O. Shamir, “Detecting correlations with little memory and communication,” in
Proceedings of the 31st Conference On Learning Theory, ser. Proceedings of Machine Learning
Research, S. Bubeck, V. Perchet, and P. Rigollet, Eds., vol. 75. PMLR, 06–09 Jul 2018, pp.
1145–1198. [Online]. Available: http://proceedings.mlr.press/v75/dagan18a.html
[21] I. Diakonikolas, E. Grigorescu, J. Li, A. Natarajan, K. Onak, and L. Schmidt,
“Communication-efficient distributed learning of discrete distributions,” in Advances in Neural
Information Processing Systems 30, I. Guyon, U. V. Luxburg, S. Bengio, H. Wallach, R. Fergus,
S. Vishwanathan, and R. Garnett, Eds. Curran Associates, Inc., 2017, pp. 6394–6404.
[22] Y. Han, A. O¨zgu¨r, and T. Weissman, “Geometric lower bounds for distributed parameter
estimation under communication constraints,” ser. Proceedings of Machine Learning Research,
vol. 75. PMLR, 2018, pp. 3163–3188.
[23] J. Acharya, C. L. Canonne, and H. Tyagi, “Distributed simulation and distributed inference,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.06952, 2018.
[24] ——, “Inference under information constraints i: Lower bounds from chi-square contraction,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1812.11476, 2018.
[25] Z. Qin, Y. Yang, T. Yu, I. Khalil, X. Xiao, and K. Ren, “Heavy hitter estimation over set-valued
data with local differential privacy,” in Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 2016, pp. 192–203.
[26] J. C. Duchi, M. I. Jordan, and M. J. Wainwright, “Local privacy and statistical minimax rates,”
in Proceedings of the 54st Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, ser.
FOCS ’13. IEEE, 2013, pp. 429–438.
15
[27] A. Smith, A. Thakurta, and J. Upadhyay, “Is interaction necessary for distributed private
learning?” in Security and Privacy (SP), 2017 IEEE Symposium on. IEEE, 2017, pp. 58–77.
[28] L. Devroye and G. Lugosi, Combinatorial Methods in Density Estimation. Springer, 2001.
[29] J. Duchi, M. J. Wainwright, and M. I. Jordan, “Local privacy and minimax bounds: Sharp
rates for probability estimation,” in Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 2013,
pp. 1529–1537.
[30] S. Wang, L. Huang, P. Wang, Y. Nie, H. Xu, W. Yang, X.-Y. Li, and C. Qiao, “Mutual informa-
tion optimally local private discrete distribution estimation,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1607.08025,
2016.
[31] P. Kairouz, K. Bonawitz, and D. Ramage, “Discrete distribution estimation under local pri-
vacy,” in Proceedings of the 33rd International Conference on International Conference on
Machine Learning - Volume 48, ser. ICML’16, 2016, pp. 2436–2444.
[32] M. Ye and A. Barg, “Optimal schemes for discrete distribution estimation under locally dif-
ferential privacy,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 64, pp. 5662–5676, 2018.
[33] J. Acharya, Z. Sun, and H. Zhang, “Hadamard response: Estimating distributions privately,
efficiently, and with little communication,” in Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, ser.
Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, K. Chaudhuri and M. Sugiyama, Eds., vol. 89.
PMLR, 16–18 Apr 2019, pp. 1120–1129.
[34] R. Bassily, “Linear queries estimation with local differential privacy,” in Proceedings of Ma-
chine Learning Research, ser. Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, K. Chaudhuri and
M. Sugiyama, Eds., vol. 89. PMLR, 16–18 Apr 2019, pp. 721–729.
[35] J. Hsu, S. Khanna, and A. Roth, “Distributed private heavy hitters,” in International Collo-
quium on Automata, Languages, and Programming. Springer, 2012, pp. 461–472.
[36] R. Bassily and A. Smith, “Local, private, efficient protocols for succinct histograms,” in Pro-
ceedings of the 47th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing. ACM, 2015, pp.
127–135.
[37] R. Bassily, K. Nissim, U. Stemmer, and A. G. Thakurta, “Practical locally private heavy
hitters,” in Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 2017, pp. 2285–2293.
[38] M. Bun, J. Nelson, and U. Stemmer, “Heavy hitters and the structure of local privacy,” in
Proceedings of the 35th ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGAI Symposium on Principles of Database
Systems. ACM, 2018, pp. 435–447.
[39] O. Sheffet, “Differentially private ordinary least squares,” in Proceedings of the 34th Interna-
tional Conference on Machine Learning, ser. ICML ’17. JMLR, Inc., 2017, pp. 3105–3114.
[40] M. Gaboardi and R. Rogers, “Local private hypothesis testing: Chi-square tests,” in Interna-
tional Conference on Machine Learning, 2018, pp. 1612–1621.
[41] J. Acharya, C. L. Canonne, C. Freitag, and H. Tyagi, “Test without trust: Optimal locally
private distribution testing,” in Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, 2019.
16
[42] P. Rigollet, “Lecture notes. 18.s997: High dimensional statistics,” MIT Courses/Mathematics,
2015. https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/mathematics/18-s997-high-dimensional-statistics-spring-
2015, 2015.
17
